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Abstract 
Classical Decision Theory provides a norma­
tive framework for representing and reason­
ing about complex preferences. Straightfor­
ward application of this theory to automate 
decision making is difficult due to high elic­
itation cost. In response to this problem, 
researchers have recently developed a num­
ber of qualitative, logic-oriented approaches 
for representing and reasoning about pref­
erences. While effectively addressing some 
expressiveness issues, these logics have not 
proven powerful enough for building practical 
automated decision making systems. In this 
paper we present a hybrid approach to pref­
erence elicitation and decision making that 
is grounded in classical multi-attribute util­
ity theory, but can make effective use of the 
expressive power of qualitative approaches. 
Specifically, assuming a partially specified 
multilinear utility function, we show how 
comparative statements about classes of deci­
sion alternatives can be used to further con­
strain the utility function and thus identify 
sup-optimal alternatives. This work demon­
strates that quantitative and qualitative ap­
proaches can be synergistically integrated to 
provide effective and flexible decision sup­
port. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Within the field of automated decision making, similar 
to the early days when probability theory was consid­
ered epistemologically inadequate, utility theory these 
days faces several epistemological problems of its own. 
In particular, it is often quite difficult to elicit the re­
quired utility function, especially when the outcomes 
of the decisions are complex. While techniques exist 
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for eliciting a complete utility function from a user, 
doing so may be neither practical nor desirable. First, 
a large elicitation overhead may not be commensurate 
with the task at hand. Second, since people's prefer­
ences tend to change over time, we may wish to repre­
sent only that core of preferences that is relatively sta­
ble over some desired time period. Thus we would like 
to develop techniques for partially eliciting preferences 
and for reasoning with partially specified preferences 
in order to eliminate suboptimal decision alternatives. 
Practitioners of decision theory have addressed the 
issue of eliciting utility functions by developing a 
comprehensive framework, generally known as multi­
attribute utility theory (MAUT) [10]. Lying at the 
heart of MAUT is the notion of utility independence, 
one of the first notions introduced to exploit qual­
itative, structural aspects of preference. Suppose 
that decision outcomes can be described by a set 
X = {XI> X2, ••• ,X,.} of attributes, meaning that an 
outcome x is a value assignment (X1 = Xt .X2 = 
x2, ... ,X,. = Xn) to the attributes, a set Y C X is said 
to be utility independent of its complement X- Y, or 
Ul for short, if the preference over probability distribu­
tions P whose marginals over X-Y are a fixed, degen­
erate distribution Px-Y does not depend on Px_y. 
Utility independence occurs quite often in real-life de­
cision making situations, and in general can be de­
tected easily. When a set of attributes Y is UI, a simple 
theorem shows that we can write the utility function 
u(x) as an expression that consists of two functions 
over X - Y and one function over Y, achieving a re­
duction of dimensionality (and hence complexity). In 
particular, if every subset Y of X is UI, a condition 
called mutual utility independence (MUI), then we can 
write u(x) either in a multiplicative form: 
n 
u(x) = IT (1 + k;u;(x;)), 
i=l 
or in an additive form: 
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n 
u(x) = L k;u;(x;), 
i=l 
where u; are so-called sub-utility functions that cap­
ture the decision maker's preference with regard to 
attribute X; when holding the attributes X;,i "# i 
at some fixed level, and k; are constants that ensure 
proper global scaling 1• 
Whenever MUI is applicable, the utility function can 
be obtained in the following two steps: 
1. Determining the individual objectives. The sub­
utility functions u;, i = 1, ... , n are assessed. For 
this purpose, the decision maker is asked to rank 
decision consequences that have the values for 
X;, j "# i fixed. This step is relative simple. For 
example, when X; is propositional, the cost of as­
sessing u; is zero; u; is either 0 or 1, depending 
on x; being the inferior or superior value. 
2. Determining the tradeoffs. The scaling coefficients 
k;, i = 1, ... , n are assessed, typically by determing 
the relative ratios for certain pairs of the scaling 
coefficients. For this purpose, the decision maker 
is asked to rank decision consequences that differ 
in the two corresponding attributes. 
In real-world situations, however, MUI is often not ap­
plicable. For example, we may only be able to struc­
ture the outcome space in terms of attributes that are 
individually UI, i.e., {X;} is UI, i = 1, 2, ... , n. In such 
cases, the utility function takes on the multi-linear 
(MLUF) form: 
u(x) = L ky. IT u;(x;), (1) 
0;f!;X X;EY 
where u; are sub-utility functions, and ky, 0 "# Y � X 
are scaling coefficients. 
In the case when the utility function is assumed to be 
multi-linear, while assessing the sub-utility functions 
u; is still relatively easy, assessing a total of 2n - 1 
scaling coefficients is quite daunting 2. This complex­
ity poses a difficult dilemma to the decision analyst: 
she can either work with an additive or a multiplica­
tive function even when evidence suggests that MUI is 
violated, in effect obtaining an approximate model of 
the decision maker's preference, or work with a MLUF, 
1 Usually, the constants k; are scaled so that both u and 
sub-utility functions u; have the range [0, 1]. 
2In fact, in the case when there are more than 3 at­
tributes, assessment of MLUFs is usually abandoned [10]. 
placing a sizable elicitation burden on herself and on 
the decision maker. 
Our perception is that in real-world applications of 
decision theory, decision analysts often choose the for­
mer option: to assume MUI. In this paper, we pro­
pose to study MLUFs 3. Because complete elicitation 
of MLUFs is impractical, we set out to develop tech­
niques to reason with partially elicited MLUFs. In 
particular, these techniques are designed to identify 
sub-optimal decision alternatives without assessing all 
the 2n - 1 scaling coefficients (expected utilities thus 
are not explicitly computed). The premises of these 
techniques are the following: 
(i) The set of available decision alternatives is 
finite. Each decision alternative results in a 
completely specified probability distribution 
over the states of the world. 
(ii) The decision maker's utility function is 
multi-linear. The sub-utility functions have 
already been elicited, but the scaling coeffi­
cients are still unknown. 
(iii) The decision maker can provide a set of 
preferential comparisons of the form Pi j 
q;, j, where Pi and q; are decision conse­
quences 4• 
In Section 2, we show that the above assumptions can 
be captured by a polyhedral cone that constrains the 
unknown scaling coefficients ky. We then use standard 
optimization techniques to deduce further preferential 
information such as induced dominance and potential 
optimality from this constraint. An inherent benefit 
of these techniques is that they can be used to detect 
inconsistency in the prefence information elicited from 
the user. (We note that previously, Hazen presented a 
preference cone approach for reasoning with partially 
specified additive or multiplicative utility functions (9), 
which is similar to the approach presented in this pa­
per.) 
The key assumption in this approach is (iii), which 
assumes that the decision maker can provide prefer­
ential comparisons between (real or fictious) decision 
consequences. This assumption is an integral part of 
interactive approaches to decision making (12, 9, 11). 
3Bacchus and Grove also take this stand: "We conjec­
ture that [multilinear utility models] might be worth study­
ing in the context of artificial intelligence applications, and 
in particular for giving a better decision-theoretic account 
of goal" [2]. 
4In this paper, we use the term "decision consequences" 
to indicate both outcomes, which are consequences of deci­
sions with certainty, and prospects, which are consequences 
of decisions with uncertainty. Prospects are probability 
distributions over outcomes. 
The rationale for making this assumption is that there 
are certain circumstances where it might be easier for 
the decision maker to express preferences among de­
cision consequences than to introspect about the at­
tributes describing each one. For example, in express­
ing preferences about movies, most people can readily 
express their preferences over two films they have seen 
in the past but may have difficulty describing prefer­
ences over attributes like director, leading actor, or 
costum designer. In fact, most people would not even 
recognize the names of the costume designers, even 
when they may have a preference for films with nice 
costumes. 
The more comparisons the decision maker can provide, 
the more conclusive inference can be made. In partic­
ular, if the decision maker can provide a succint, qual­
itative statement about her preference that implicitly 
encoded a set of comparision statements, then we may 
be able to quickly identify a large set of sub-optimal 
alternatives. 
To capture such preferential statements and derive ef­
ficient inference mechanisms using them is one of the 
aims of the field of qualitative decision theory. Recent 
work from this field has attempted to address the elici­
tation problem by providing formal languages in which 
partial preference information can be conveniently ex­
pressed [5, 6, 15, 3, 1]. For example, the languages pro­
posed by Doyle and Wellman [6] and by Tan and Pearl 
[15] attempt to provide a semantic to ceteris paribus 
(all else being equal) comparative statements. These 
are preferential statements concerning classes of deci­
sion consequences. 
While these languages have successfully addressed a 
number of expressiveness issues, the inferential mech­
anisms available have not been sufficiently powerful for 
building practical decision making systems. In Section 
3, we propose using ceteris paribus comparative state­
ments, as presented in [6], as a means to represent com­
parative statements made by the decision maker, to be 
used in conjunction with the assumptions (i), (ii), and 
(iii) described above. This combination provides us 
with a flexible representation for eliciting preferences 
and an inferrential mechanism to effectively eliminate 
decision alternatives. The resulting hybrid framework 
is intended to strike a balance between logic-oriented 
(generally too weak), and numeric-oriented (generally 
too cost-intensive) approaches. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec­
tion 2, we develop the preference cone framework to 
reason with partial MLUF and pairwise comparisions. 
In Section 3, we propose to intergrate qualitative pref­
erential comparisons to the this framework and provide 
an example to illustrate this idea. We finish with dis-
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cussion of related work and future research issues. 
2 REASONING WITH PARTIALLY 
ELICITED MULTI-LINEAR 
UTILIT Y FUNCTIONS USING 
POLYHEDRAL CONES 
In this section we explore the idea of using explicit 
pairwise comparisons of decision consequences to iden­
tify sub-optimal alternatives, as outlined in the Intro­
duction. The premises of this analysis are assumptions 
(i), (ii), (iii). 
2.1 LINEAR CONSTRAINTS ON THE 
SCALING COEFFICIENTS OF MLUFS 
First, note that the multilinear form of the utility func­
tion, as formalized in Equation (1) does not fully cap­
ture the assumption that the attributes X; are UI; the 
multilinear form is only a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for X; to be UI. We need to add constraints 
on the scaling coefficients ky in order to obtain a nec­
essary and sufficient condition. 
Take, for example, the assumption that X; is UI. Let 
ty(x) = I1x;eYu;(x;), 0 � Y � X. The multi-linear 
utility function u(x) in Equation 1 can be written as 
u(x) = L kyty(x) 
0o;OY�X 
= 
( 
L k{x;}uztz(x)) u;(x;) 
Z�X-{X;} 
+ L kyty(x), 
0o;OY�X-{X;} 
and thus can be viewed as a linear function of u;(x;). 
Thus to say that X; is UI is equivalent to say that 
the coefficient for u; ( x;) in this linear function must 
be non-negative. Formally, this means 
L k{x;}uztz(x);::: 0. (2) 
Z�X-{X;} 
Moreover, this inequality must be satisfied for any 
value assignment to the attributes in the set X- {X;}. 
Inversely, if this constraint is satisfied, then X; is UI. In 
other words, the utility independence of the attributes 
X; is precisely captured by the multilinear form as in 
Equation ( 1), with the additional linear, homogeneous 
constraints about the scaling constants, as expressed 
in Inequality ( 2). 
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To further simplify the expositions, we introduce the 
following notations. Let k denote the &-dimensional 
( d = 2n - 1) vector with components ky, 0 f. Y � 
X. For any i = 1, 2, .. . , n, let s' denote the same­
dimension vector whose components are functions s� : 
X -t !R, 0 f. Y � X, defined as: 
. { 0 s�(x) = -tv-{x,}(x) 
if X; !t Y 
otherwise. 
Note that the functions s�(x) do not depend on x;, 
the i-th component of x. Inequality ( 2) can thus be 
written as 
(k, s'(x)) ::; 0, Vi= 1, 2, ... , n; x, 
where (., .) denotes the inner product of two vectors. 
One may at first think that these constraints are by 
themselves strong enough to imply non-trivial prefer­
ences over decision alternatives. However, the results 
that we were able to obtain in our previous work [7], 
presented in the theorem below, suggest that further 
preferences can be deduced in only very special cases. 
Theorem 1 Let p and q be two decision alternatives. 
Further assume that Ep[u;(x;)] ::; Eq[u;(x;)], Vi, i.e., q 
would be prefered to p if we took the sub-utility function 
u;(x;) as our overall utility junction. From these so­
called local dominance conditions, we can infer overall 
dominance, i.e. p ::$ q if either: 
(a) the utility junction is additive, or 
(b) in the probability distributions p and q, 
the attributes X;, when viewed as random 
variables, are probabilistically independent. 
Furthermore, the inference is not sound if the utility 
junction is multiplicative. 
2.2 LINEAR CONSTRAINTS FOR 
PAffiWISE COMPARISONS 
In order to be able to infer a pairwise preference, we 
need to impose very strong conditions, either about 
the form of the utility function (it must be additive), 
or about alternatives (they must be probabilistically 
independent}, in addition to having the local domi­
nances. When these conditions do not hold, we need 
other sources of preferential information in order to be 
able to identify sub-optimal alternatives and to nar­
row down the set of candidate alternatives. One such 
source is pairwise comparison statements made by the 
decision maker. 
Note that the statement p ::$ q translates into the fol­
lowing inequalities: 
E,[u(x)] � E.[u(x)] ¢} 
E, [� >yty(x)] � E. [�kyty(x)] ¢} 
LkYE,[ty(x)] � L kyE.[ty(x)]. 
y y 
Now, denoting ty(p) = Ep[ty(x)] = LxP(x}ty(x), 
and ty(q) = Eq[ty(x)] = Lz q(x)tv(x), we then have 
p:jq * L: kyty(p>::; L: kyty(q) 
y y 
* (k, tp - tq) ::; 0, 
where tp (respectively tq) denotes the (2n - I)­
dimensional vector whose components are ty(p) (re­
spectively t11(q)). This last inequality is also a linear, 
homogeneous constraint over the unknown constants 
ky. 
2.3 SOME BASIC CONCEPTS OF 
CONVEX CONE ANALYSIS 
Before we continue our analysis, we provide a brief 
review of some basic concepts of convex cone analysis. 
Polyhedra, Cones, and Polyhedral Cones 
The d-dimension Euclidean Space is the vector space 
!Rd equipped with the inner product(). Given a vector 
n, and a E !R, the set 11a = {x/(n,x) =a} is called 
a hyperplane, the set n;; = { x/ (n, x) :::; a} is called a 
closed hal/space with outward normal n. For simplicity 
of notations, the subscript a is omitted when a = 0. 
The intersection of a finite number of closed halfspaces 
is called a polyhedron. 
A set W � !Rd is called a cone with apex 0 if AX E W 
whenever A > 0 and x E W. A set W is a cone with 
apex a E �-if W- a:= {x - a/x E W} is a cone 
with apex 0. In this paper, cones are all 0-apexed, 
unless indicated otherwise. Given a set W � !Rd, the 
set of all points that can be expressed as non-negative 
linear combinations of points of W can be shown to 
be a convex cone, and is denoted by Cw. This cone 
is called the convex cone generated by W and can be 
equivalently defined as the smallest convex cone con­
taining W. A cone that is also a polyhedron is called a 
polyhedral cone. It is well-known that polyhedral cones 
are precisely convex cones generated by finite sets of 
points, and can be shown to be closed. 
Dual Cones 
Given a set w � �. let w· be defined as w· := 
{YI(x,y) $ 0, 'v'x E W}. W* is easily shown to be 
a convex cone and is refered to as the dual cone of 
W. For example, if W contains a single point n, then 
the dual cone of W is n-, the closed halfspace with 
outward normal n. 
The following theorem is standard in convex cone anal­
ysis. 
Theorem 2 Let W � !Rd. 
(a) w• = ( Cw )*. Any set and the convex cone it 
generates share the same dual cone. 
{b) w•• := (W•)• = Cw. The dual cone of the dual 
cone of W is equal to the closure of the convex cone 
it generates. In particular, if W is finite, then w•• = 
Cw. 
2.4 INDUCED DOMINANCE, 
POTENTIAL OPTIMALITY, AND 
INCONSISTENCY DETECTION 
Recall that the analysis in Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 
shows that the assumptions (i), (ii), and (iii) described 
in the Introduction can be precisely captured by the 
following inequalities 
{ 
(k, si(x)) < 0, 'v'i, x 
(k, tp; - tq;) < 0,\fj. 
Assuming that the domain of each attribute X; is fi­
nite, the above inequalities are equivalent to a finite 
set of linear homogeneous constraints over the scaling 
coefficients ky. From now on, we denote these con­
straints as follows { (k, w;) ::; Olj = l..m}, and denote 
W = {w;li = l..m}. Thus, the utility function u, 
when represented as a vector k with coordinates ky, 
must lie in the intersection of the closed halfspaces 
with outward normal w;: 
m 
k E K:= n wj. 
j=l 
This intersection is a polyhedral cone, which is the 
dual cone K = W* of W. Using Theorem 2, we have 
that K* = w•• = Cw, i.e., the dual cone of K, the 
set of admissible k, is the polyhedral cone generated 
by the constraint vectors w; (see Figure 1). 
Induced Dominance 
The above analysis i=ediately leads to the following 
result that can be used to test for induced dominance. 
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Figure 1: A 2-dimensional illustration of Theorem 3. 
Here W = {wbw2}· 
Theorem 3 Given a pair of alternatives (p, q), we 
can deduce p ::5 q iff tp - tq E Cw. The "only if " 
part means that if tp - tq ¢ Cw, then there exists 
k E K such that (k, tp - tq) > 0, i.e. p >- q under 
such k. 
Below is an algorithm for testing induced dominance. 
This "inference rule" is sound and complete based on 
the above theorem. 
Algorithm 1 . 
Input: Two prospects p and q. 
Output: Return 
{ 1 if p::5q, 
-1 if q ::5 p, 
0 if the relationship between 
p and q cannot be determined. 
1. Determine a set of generators {k1ll} of the poly­
hedral cone K. 
2. Return 1, if (kl! tp - tq) ::; 0, \fl . 
9. Return -1, if (kt, tq- tp) ::; 0, \fl. 
�- Return 0, otherwise. 
Complexity Analysis 
The complexity of Algorithm 1 is determined by the 
complexity of determining the generators {k1ll} of the 
polyhedral cone K (step 1). These vectors are out­
ward normal vectors of the ( d - 1 )-dimension facets of 
the polyhedron Cw. This problem is essentially the 
same problem as finding the facet normals of the con­
vex hull of a set of points in the (d- I)-dimension 
space, which can be solved in time O(mrd/21-1) using 
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algorithms from computational geometry [14). Here, 
m is the number of the elements of W, and d = 2" - 1 
is the dimension of the space (which is the number of 
the scaling coefficients). 
Potential Optimality 
We can also test for potential optimality in a straight­
forward way. Given a set of decicision alternatives 
{a1,a2, ... ,am} resulting in the corresponding prob­
ability distributions {Pl>P2• ... , pm}, decision alterna­
tive ar is potentially optimal if tpr - tp8 ¢ Cw, V 8 = 
1, 2, .. . , m, 8 i' r, or, equivalently, the polyhedral cone 
generated by { tpr - tp8l8 = 1, 2, ... , m, 8 i' r} inter­
sects with Cw at the origin only. 
To conclude this section, we note that in complex de­
cision making problems, the decision maker may easily 
exhibit inconsistent preferences. For example, she may 
assert a set of comparative statements that results in 
an empty preference cone (K = 0). In sucll situa­
tions, we would like the system to restore consistency 
by eliminating one or more "problematic" compara­
tive statements. But how to identify sucll problematic 
statements is an open question and needs further re­
search and experiment. 
3 INTERGRATING QUALITATIVE 
COMPARATIVE STATEMENTS 
In the previous section we have shown how compar­
ative statements about decision consequences can be 
exploited to test for induced dominance and potential 
optimality. Since there are 2" - 1 unknown scaling 
coefficients, cllances are that we would need an inor­
dinately large number of pair-wise comparisions from 
the decision maker in order to make useful inferences. 
Qualitative preference logics such as those proposed 
by Doyle and Wellman [5, 6) and Tan and Pearl [15) 
provide languages that can express comparative state­
ments about classes of decision consequences. Sucll a 
qualitative expression of preferences gives us a large 
number of pair-wise preferences among individual de­
cision conequences, which can be used to effectively 
constrain the space of utility functions. 
In this section we give an example to illustrate this 
idea. In this example, the state space has three propo­
sitional attributes {X1,X2,X3} with domains {0,1}. 
Suppose also that the attributes are utility indepen­
dent in sucll a way that for eacll attribute, 1 is the 
prefered value. This means that the sub-utility func­
tions u;(x;) for the attributes are given by u;(x;) = x;. 
The overall utility function can be written as 
u(x1,x2,xa) = k1x1 + k2x2 + kaxa + 
k12X1X2 + k13X1X3 + �3X2X3 + k123X1X2X3. 
Next, we translate the assumption about utility inde­
pendence of the attributes into constraints about the 
scaling constants. Let us consider attribute X1. To 
say that X1 is UI is equivalent to say that the overall 
utility function 
u(x1, x2, xa) = (k1 + k12X2 + k1axa + k123X2xa)x1 + 
�x2 + kaxa + k2ax2xa, 
when viewed as a linear function of x1 must have pos­
itive coefficient for X1, i.e. 
Considering all value assigments for x2 and x3, the UI 
assumption for xl implies the following inequalities 
involving the scaling constants: 
>0 
>0 
>0 
>0 
(3) 
The utility independence for X2 and Xa can be ex­
pressed similarly: 
{ 
� >0 
k2 + k12 >0 
�+ k23 >0 
k2 + k12 + �3 + kl23 >0 
(4) 
{ 
ka >0 
ka + k1a >0 
ka + k2a >0 
ka + k1a + k2a + k123 >0 
(5) 
Note that the inequality k1 > 0 is equivalent to the 
comparison statement (0, 0, 0) -< (1, 0, 0), and the in­
equality k1 +k12 > 0 is equivalent to (0, 1, 0) -< (1, 1, 0). 
Now suppose that the decision maker states that she 
prefers to have (x1 = 1, X2 = 0) to (x1 = 0, x2 = 1), all 
else being equal, i.e. regardless of the value of x3. This 
statement is equivalent to the following constraints: 
(6) 
Using Algorithm 1 with the Constraints (3), (4), (5), 
and (6), we will be able to obtain that, for example, 
(1, 0, 1) >- {(.5, (0, 1, 1), (.3, (1, 0, 0)), (.2, (0, 1, 0)}, 
where the right hand side is a probability distribu­
tion giving the probabilities .5, .3, .2 to the states 
(0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), respectively. 
4 RELATED WORK 
The idea of representing partial preference information 
using polyhedral cones has appeared in work in the 
field of Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM). 
In this work, decision alternatives are scored according 
to a finite number of criteria, and the overall score for 
each alternative is a (value) function of the individ­
ual scores. In this sense, all decision alternatives re­
sult in certain outcomes that have scores as attributes. 
In contrast, in this paper, the consequences of deci­
sions are uncertain. Furthermore, in work in MCDM, 
the value function is usually assumed to have some 
tractable form such as (in increasing order of gener­
ality) linear (16], quasiconcave (12, 13], or monotonic 
(11]. In this paper, the decision maker's utilty func­
tion is assumed to have multi-linear form. Since multi­
linear functions can be non-monotonic (see Theorem 
1), it is not immediately clear if the preference cone 
techniques from the work in MCDM mentioned above 
can be used in our approach. 
5 DISCUSSION 
Classical Decision Theory provides a normative frame­
work for representing and reasoning about complex 
preferences. Straightforward application of this essen­
tially quantitative theory to automate decision making 
is difficult due to high cost of eliciting utility func­
tions. Recent work from the field of qualitative deci­
sion theory offers several alternative solutions. These 
approaches focus on developing formal languages that 
can express qualitative, partial preference information. 
However, the inference mechanisms offered by these 
languages remain rather weak. 
It is thus highly desirable to develope a framework 
that can exploit different strengths of these different 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. In this paper, 
we attempt to provide such a framework. Assuming 
a multi-linear utility function with known sub-utility 
functions, we show how ceteris paribus comparative 
statements by the decision maker can be used to infer 
further preferential information such as induced pair­
wise preference and sub-optimality. 
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There are several issues that we plan to address in 
this framework. The first issue is efficiency. Note 
that the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is exponen­
tial (O(mf"/21-I )). The base of this upper bound, 
which is the number of the constraint vectors w;, can 
be large. A possible solution for this is to investi­
gate ways to effectively use sets of comparisions, repre­
sented by qualitative logical constructs. For example, 
a ceteris paribus comparison, which is equivalent to a 
set of comparisions between individual decision conse­
quences, can sometimes be captured by a single linear 
inequality involving certain (but not all) scaling coef­
ficients. This would result in fewer constraint vectors. 
With regard to the exponent of the upper bound, since 
in practice, the number of attributes ( n) is usually very 
small (3-8), we expect the exponent (rd/21-1) not to 
exceed 127. We can also try to exploit further util­
ity independencies, if applicable, to reduce the num­
ber of scaling coefficients and to reduce the exponent. 
For example, if Y is UI of X - Y and IYI = r, then 
the number of scaling coefficients can be reduced to 
2r + 2n-r+I - 4. If both Y and X - Y are UI of the 
other, then the number can be reduced to 2r + 2n-r- 2 
(Keeney & Raiffa 1976 (10], Chapter 6.10.3). F inally, 
we point out that since the motivation of our work is 
to reduce the elicitation time, which in most cases is 
much larger than the computation time, this approach 
to reasoning with partial preference information could 
sometimes provide an attractive option despite the in­
volved computational complexity. 
Second, instead of working with only the supplied pref­
erences, we may want the system to take the initiative 
and ask the user to make comparisons between deci­
sion consequences, or sets of decision consequences (us­
ing some qualitative logical constructs). To this end, 
the most interesting issue is identifying the questions 
whose answers would lead to the most conclusive infer­
ence, e.g., induced optimality of a particular decision 
alternative, or induced sub-optimality of a large num­
ber of decision alternatives 5• A difficulty with this 
approach is that the user may not be able to answer 
some of those queries. 
Finally, it is interesting to see if this approach to rea­
soning with partially elicited preference information 
can be intergrated into the case-based framework to 
preference elicitation advocated in our recent work [8] 
(see also (4]). In this framework, the system maintains 
a population of users with their preferences partially 
or completely specified in a given domain. When en­
countering a new user, called A, the system first elicits 
some preference information from A, and then deter­
mines which user in the population has the preference 
50ur previous work [7] has addressed this issue in a 
special case when the utility function is additive. 
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structure that is closest to A's. The preference struc­
ture of that user will be used to determine an initial 
default representation (or working model) of A's pref­
erences. We can use the techniques presented in this 
paper to elicit some initial preference information from 
the decision maker and to eliminate some sub-optimal 
decision alternatives. If the set of remaining decision 
candidates is still large, the system can use the case­
based approach to make recommendations for the de­
cision maker. 
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